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Saudi Arabian Budgetary Dilemmas 
Robert E. Looney 
In 1986, Saudi Arabia experienced widely fluctuating oil markets.1 The de-
cline in oil prices from a high of $28 a barrel in January 1986 to a low of $8 
in mid-year called for a radical restructuring in several areas of the economy 
and administration. 
An indication of the seriousness of the decline in the oil market became 
apparent in March 1986 when the 1986/87 national budget was deferred for 
at least five months, with public spending continuing at the average monthly 
level of 1985. In August, 1986, the budget was deferred again because of the 
difficulty of predicting national revenues at a time of great uncertainty in the 
oil markets. 
When the budget was announced on 31 December 1986, it contained a 
surprisingly high expenditure level of SR 170,000 ($43,335 million), only 
six per cent below that allocated in the previous fiscal year. There were also 
substantial allocations for capital projects - SR 50,0000 ($13,335 million) -
and for operations and maintenance - SR 20,000 ($5,335 million). 
The OPEC accord reached in Geneva in December enabled the kingdom 
to set a higher target for oil revenues in 1987 than in fiscal 1985/86. At 
SR 65,200 million ($17,390), estimated oil earnings are 6.5 per cent up, 
representing more that 55 per cent of total government revenues. The rest 
will come from investment income, estimated at about $8 billion, and re-
serves. 
The budget allows for a deficit of SR 52,700 million ($14,055 million). 
In the previous budget no deficit was foreseen but a $14,000 million short-
fall was incurred. Avoiding borrowing or politically sensitive tax measures 
deficits will most likely continue to be made up from reserves estimated at 
around $90 billion.2 
Presumably these projections will reassure the country's private sector 
that the bottom has been reached in prices and production and that hence-
forth the government will press ahead with the Fourth Five-Year Develop-
ment Plan which came into effect in 1985 without depleting reserves to levels 
that would be imprudent. The new oil strategy implemented in late 1986 and 
centered on a price of$18 a barrel appears to be holding. Saudi Arabia's King 
Fahd has indicated numerous times that he would like to see prices remain 
stable for at least two years. 
Realistically however it is likely that the government will face falling or 
at best stable oil revenues for the next several years. Clearly the major 
problem currently facing the government is how best to utilize its dwindling 
oil revenues to generate positive overall rates of economic growth while at 
the same time meeting to the fullest extent possible the basic needs of the 
majority of the population. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore several options the government 
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GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY 
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Public spending has been the principal factor in the kingdom's remarkable 
boom decade which ended in 1983. Growth continues to depend on the flow 
of funds through the government, but the volumes being disbursed at present 
(1987) are about 36 per cent less than the 1982 peak.3 
This has been reflected in the level of output. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) at constant prices was more than 24 per cent lower in 1986 than 
in 1982 when national production was at its highest. In terms of individual 
sectors the contraction in output has been even more spectacular:4 
This has prompted a debate in the kingdom as to how the economy 
can be encouraged to develop and expand. Some sections of the business 
community have been lobbying the government to increase its overall level 
of expenditure to help restore growth. In turn officials have been asking 
why the private sector, one of the most liquid and wealthy in the developing 
world is not doing more to help the process. In this regard, the agricultural 
sector has come under increased scrutiny. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
In particular the authorities are concerned that Saudi farmers are not 
investing enough of their own resources in agriculture, but instead are 
continuing to rely on a number of government supports. To many observ-
ers, agriculture is the most logical area to examine for potential budgetary 
savings. 
The government has at tremendous cost~ attempted, partly for security 
reasons to achieve relative self-sufficiency in food. 
At first glance the results seem impressive: in less than a decade Saudi 
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Arabia has turned itself into the breadbasket of the Gulf. Between the 
mid-1970s and 1985 wheat output grew more than tenfold, to over 2 
million tonnes. During that period the increase in Saudi production ac-
counted for four-fifths of the rise in wheat output for the entire Middle 
East and North Africa. Wheat production is now far above domestic 
needs and there is a severe shortage of storage capacity. Block, US 
Secretary of Agriculture, called the Saudi wheat program 'crazy' but 
the official Saudi position is that it has been 'a thrilling story of real 
success.5 
As noted above, to achieve all this, the Saudi Arabian government has 
spent vast sums of its oil wealth on price supports, grants, input subsidies and 
interest free credit. To meet its targets for the Fourth Plan the government 
originally anticipated spending nearly 11 billion riyals. Loans granted by the 
Saudi Agricultural Bank6 increased particularly rapidly7 after the oil price 
increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80. In fact, subsidized loans from the Bank 
increased from 2. 9 per cent in 1974 to nearly 50 per cent in 1983 of the total 
value of agricultural output. Subsidized loans also increased their ratio to 
total commercial bank private credit from 0.8 per cent to 7 .3 per cent during 
this period. 
The result has been the creation of a farming sector that appears to be 
technologically sophisticated, but is economically very inefficient. As noted 
above, now that oil revenues have declined and the real costs have become 
clearer, the government has begun to question some of these policies. 
The following sections examine the potential benefits that reductions in 
agricultural expenditures would have in offseting the decline in government 
revenues. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM REDUCED AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURES 
Before the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia was primarily an agricultural coun-
try. Where possible, sedentary farming was practiced, but much of the farm-
ing was nomadic. 8 Poor soils and very little water were the facts of life for the 
people of Saudi Arabia for millennia. Production was nearly subsistence in 
nature.9 
By the end of the 1960s, it had become evident that the scope for 
agricultural modernization would be severely limited if it relied on alter-
ing the existing relations of production. In the sedentary sphere, there was 
little scope for any kind of modernization without a fundamental altera-
tion in property ownership patterns. Nonetheless, land was available for 
expansion, but it fell under the rubric of hema landlO and its status was 
still ambiguous. It was also apparent to most observers that any attempt at 
sedentarization of pastoralists, or of integrating them into national markets, 
was unlikely to be successful while either: 
1. pastoral patterns continued to be vijlble (either through objective 
economic factors or as a result of subsidies) 
2. or as the alternative of military service and or urban work was avail-
able and highly lucrative. 
• 
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In short, Saudi Arabia was confronted with the dilemma typical of many 
oil economies over the issue of agriculture - whether it was better to at-
tempt to resolve the growing alienation and sense of marginalization of rural 
populations or whether the growing problem of food insufficiency should 
take precedence.11 
By 1980 the Government had decided to make agriculture a major prior-
ity. This was done by creating a totally new situation in which the prob-
lems inherent in the existing social and economic agricultural patterns could 
be circumnavigated - although existing agriculturalists would find opportu-
nities to participate if they wished.12 In fact, Saudi officials went so far as 
to exhort farmers to produce a substantial part of the country's basic food 
needs or, in the words of the Third Development Plan13 to establish and 
maintain a prudent level of self-sufficiency in food production. 
Particularly since 1980, financial encouragement by the state of food 
production by the private sector has become the most important single 
factor influencing agricultural change. However, three other issues are 
especially significant in influencing policy towards agriculture. They can be 
summarily described as relating to water resources, manpower and regional 
stability - a familiar trio in the setting of the Arabian peninsula.14 
The importance given agriculture by the Saudi Arabian government may 
seem somewhat surprising when set against a background of an extremely 
hostile environment and the chronic manpower shortage which affects not 
only the economy in general, but agriculture in particular. And yet, the 
evidence now clearly indicates that the 1980s have been a decade of quickly 
accelerating agricultural transformation. This phenomenon is in sharp con-
trast to the 1960s, characterized by progressive stagnation and the 1970s, a 
decade of slowly growing momentum. 
Simply put, the relevant question with regard to the country's agricultural 
strategy is whether or not the government programs to increase self-
sufficiency in food can be justified and or sustained in the post-1982 era 
of declining government revenues. 
Agricultural Credit 
In the eight years up to April 1983, 27,000 farmers received over SR 11.8 
billion in loans from the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB), and 
agricultural production subsidies administered by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Water (MAW) between 1975 and 1985 totalled SR 6.7 billion; in 
1982/83 SAAB loans reached SR 4.2 billion, but as noted above began to 
decline in recent years, falling back in 1983/84 to SR 3.5 billion and SR 2.3 
billion in 1984/85. Project lending now account for just under 50 per cent 
of SAAB lending activity. 
Between 1978 and 1982 the MAW licensed 977 agricultural projects with 
costs totalling ST 9.58 billion, including 129 wheat and fodder projects cost-
ing SR 1.9 billion, 152 greenhouse projects fOSting SR 1.8 billion, 189 egg 
production ventures at SR 1.5 billion and 267 for poultry costing SR 1 bil-
lion. The recent average level of investment for private investment projects 
approved by MAW which has been in excess of SR 1 m., indicated that 
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an agricultural dichotomy has occurred and a modem, commercial, highly 
capitalized sector, completely divorced from traditional small-scale farming, 
has not been created. At the same time 13.2 billion was disbursed between 
1975 and 1983 on food and feed subsidies.ls 
Crop Subsidies 
As noted above many observers have argued that in addition to subsidized 
farm credit, the recent expansion of agriculture in the Kingdom has been 
largely attributable to extensive financial support in the form of: 16 
1. subsidies of 50 per cent of the cost of fertilizers and 100 per cent of 
the cost of pesticides. 
2. subsidies of 20-30 per cent of the cost of equipment for poultry and 
dairy farms, and 40-50 per cent on selected farming equipment. 
3. subsidies on purchase of date palms and seed potato. 
4. subsidies of 100 per cent on the air freight cost of importing cattle, 
provided at least fifty head are imported at one time. 
The results of the government's credit and subsidy programme are, as 
noted above starting to pay off in terms of fairly spectacular results; Saudi 
Arabia is now self-sufficient in wheat, eggs, and dates. In fact, it has a small 
exportable surplus in all these commodities, which tends in the case of wheat 
and dates to be donated rather than sold abroad. Wheat production figures 
vary between those giving estimated overall production and those recording 
deliveries to the Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization. In 1982/83 the 
volume of wheat sold to the government was 674,631 tonnes against an overall 
production figures of 817 ,478 tonnes. 
However, a number of problems have been associated with subsidy 
programs. Over-production for example has been a major problem, and 
one whose costs in an era of austerity are becoming hard to justify. For 
example in 1983/84 and 1984/85 wheat deliveries were 1,346,930 tonnes 
and 1,700,000 tonnes respectively. Local demand however was around 
1.0m. tonnes. The government's efforts to try and dissuade farmers from 
planting wheat have been hampered by the emergence of a strong farmers' 
(especially wheat growers) lobby. This is particularly evident from the fact 
that in late 1986, the government decided to subsidize barley-growing in the 
kingdom, but at rates roughly one half that paid wheat farmers: 
It was obviously felt to be politically impossible to reduce the guaran-
teed purchase price for wheat further, at the same time as bordering 
on the ridiculous at a time of government financial restraint to sanction 
a price for barley any more in excess of world prices. This is despite 
the fact that the Saudi government has been paying more than the 
world market for some time in order to cater to the kingdom's rapidly 
expanding demand for barley . . . for although the SRl per kg price for 
barley is roughly four times the world price, the difference in produc-
tion costs in Saudi Arabia is not that great, and it seems clear that wheat 
producers are still being guaranteed a wider profit margin. One recent 
estimate put the cost of barley production in the kingdom at SRl/kg, 
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against SR.25/kg. for wheat, suggesting that the new subsidy offers 
hardly any guaranteed profit margin for barley growers. Even if this 
estimate of barley production cost is to high, it is clear that wheat 
producers are still being courted by the government.17 
However cuts in guaranteed government purchase prices of wheat and 
new moves to introduce quotas on the volumes the government must take 
from large farms are anticipated. The government is hoping that the switch 
away from wheat will not affect agricultural output overall, but lead to in-
creased production of barley and vegetables. 
International circles have criticized Saudi Arabia for paying this unrea-
sonable price. Some have even gone so far as to demand that the government 
lift its wheat supports, as American Secretary of Agriculture John Block 
did, offering better American wheat at lower prices. The Saudi reply was 
total rejection. 
Saudi officials have a very different view of their wheat policy, one that 
is reasonable for the most part and which can be summarized as follows:lS 
1. Wheat is a strategic commodity exactly like oil, but more important. 
In the post the Saudis have been threatened by the United States 
about possible embargoes on the Arabs a wheat embargo, if the 
Arabs imposed an oil embargo. 
2. The price of wheat has varied in previous years between $200 and 
$117 per tonne, creating uncertainty about the volume of foreign 
exchange required to import the Kingdom's requirements. 
3. Saudi programs achieve self-sufficiency in wheat, and expand the 
cultivated area in the countryside, job opportunities and good 
utilization of resources in addition to saving at least $300 million 
a year that it would have paid in foreign currency for wheat. In 
addition the Saudi government offers the wheat to consumers at 
subsidized prices, and when it is cultivated it offers subsidies for 
wheat in riyals, and not dollars. 
4. If Saudi Arabia did not encourage agriculture in general, and wheat 
in particular, it would have to create tens of thousands of job 
opportunities for those now working in agriculture. Most of these 
opportunities would be in government administration, which would 
increase the burden on the government's already rising deficit. In 
addition, a failure to develop the countryside would cause the rural 
population to emigrate to the cities, enlarging them and forcing 
billions of riyals to be spent on expanding urban facilities. 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS IN THE FOURTII DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
Most of the programmes outlined above have been extended and or en-
larged during the Fourth Development Plan period (1985-90). The Plan 
anticipates agriculture as one of the key elements in the government's 
strategy to diversify the economy .19 • 
It has long been recognized that the importance of agriculture to the 
Kingdom extends beyond that of its contribution to national output 
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alone. At the end of the Third Plan period, almost half of the King-
dom's population was living in rural areas and a significant proportion 
of total Saudi employment was in agriculture. Apart from the stra-
tegic significance of increasing domestic food production for a grow-
ing population, the planned development of agriculture fulfils other 
important roles. It generates employment both within the sector and in 
closely related agro-industries. In contributes to the diversification of 
the economic base and to import substitution, while raising income lev-
els and improving rural living standards for both settled and nomadic 
communities alike. This has a positive influence on the population 
balance and helps to prevent population drift to the urban centers. A 
further important aspect of agricultural development in the Kingdom 
is its role in maintaining the ecological balance through combatting 
desertification. 
Three major objectives provide the overall policy framework for agricul-
tural development during t.he Fourth Plan20: (a) to achieve a satisfactory 
rate of increase in farm output at minimum cost, by encouraging innovations 
which exploit the possibilities for technical change most appropriate to the 
Kingdom's natural resource endowments; (b) to achieve a broadly based 
improvement in the welfare of the rural population; and (c) to raise the 
productive and marketing efficiency of agricultural producers and to attract 
private capital investment into agriculture, through the provision of loans on 
easy terms. 
To achieve these major objectives for agricultural development, the 
government plans to adopt the following policies:21 
1. land classification surveys will be continued and arable land distrib-
uted only in those areas with high-potential renewable water re-
sources; areas with critical ground water depletion rates will be 
identified and regulations introduced relating to appropriate water 
pumping rates and acreage for specific crops; 
2. support programmes of agricultural inputs and services will be con-
tinued, including those relating to the distribution of seeds, 
seedlings and insecticides; extension services to farmers will be 
expanded; 
3. existing irrigation and drainage systems will be improved to opti-
mize water usage; 
4. mechanization of farms will be encouraged; research support will be 
provided for studies on problems specific to the Kingdom's agricul-
ture and which are oriented towards the application of appropriate 
modern technology; 
5. marketing channels will be improved by the provision of storage 
facilities for farmers; 
6. information will be collected and disseminated on agricultural 
production, prices and costs of various agricultural commodities; 
market studies will be conducted on the main cash corps and will 
include demand and supply projections; 
7. joint studies will be conducted with GCC member-countries to 
. i..:'.'?; ... ::: '~ .~·.;··~:~{~$:~·~,·c::· ;. '.~~i:~~/~fJ 
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promote inter-regional co-operation in the production storage, and 
marketing of the main food items, including fisheries; 
8. the storage capacity of the grain silos will be increased to include a 
six-month strategic stockpile of wheat; training of the development 
of agricultural manpower will be intensified at all levels, particularly 
in relation to operation and maintenance of agricultural machin-
ery; 
9. short-, medium-, and long-term loans will be provided, in accord-
ance with the needs of both small and large farmers; and 
10. supervision of lending programmes will be improved to ensure that 
cash loans are utilized for specific purposes . 
There is no doubt that with the shortfall in oil revenues, below that antici-
pated when the plan was drawn up, a number of the government's subsidies 
to agriculture will be scaled back. Wheat subsidies have already been cut 
and a number of Saudi officials are indicating that other subsidies are to 
follow: · 
It is now accepted (and illustrated by the reduction in the generous 
wheat subsidy) that as one Saudi official put it, "the experiment is 
over". He was alluding to the massive subsidy support given by the 
Government to private enterprise, which had produced spectacular 
statistical results. "Now" he went on, "the Government is saying the 
private sector must take up more fully its share of the burden and 
depend on itself' .22 
Results in Reducing Food Imports 
While self-sufficiency in agricultural products is not a realistic goal for the 
Kingdom, government officials have long expressed a desire at increasing 
the proportion of food supplies produced domestically.23 While the Saudis 
have made great strides in this direction, increased overall demand for food 
associated with the acceleration in incomes after 1973-74 appears to have 
outstripped the ability of the country to increase production. Based on the 
standard import classification scheme used by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency,24 it appears that each of the four main food import categories: (a) 
live animals and animal products, (b) vegetable products, (c) animal and 
vegetable fats, and ( d) prepared foods beverages, have all increased their 
proportion of total agricultural value added since 1968.25 
1. imports of live animal and animal products increased their share of 
total agricultural output from 30.0 per cent in 1968 to 52.6 per cent 
a decade later, reaching a high of 88.7 per cent in 1980; 
2. imports of vegetable products show a similar pattern, increasing 
from 40.0 per cent of domestic agricultural output in 1968 to 69.8 
per cent a decade later. Imports reached a peak in 1982 of 122. 7 
per cent of domestic production. • 
3. animal and vegetable fats have been the smallest import category, 
increasing from 4.6 per cent of agricultural output in 1968 reaching 
a maximum of 11.9 in 1980, an falling to 5.9 in 1984; 
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4. prepared foods and beverages, increased from 15.8 per cent of 
agricultural output in 1968 to nearly 70 per cent a decade later. 
These products increased their proportion of total agricultural 
output to nearly 90 per cent in 1980, only to fall to 49.4 per cent 
in 1984. 
5. by 1984, in all cases there had been a significant drop in the propor-
tion of each import from its maximum value. 
On the other hand, while Saudi Arabia appeared to be increasing its 
import dependence on food during this period, agricultural products as a 
percentage of total imports showed a significant decrease: 
1. live animal and animal products decreased their share of total im-
ports from 10.2 per cent in 1968 to 3.0 a decade later. This figure 
has however increased to 4.0 by 1984; 
2. vegetable products decreased as a proportion of total imports from 
13.7 per cent in 1968 to 3.9 per cent a decade later. They have also 
increased their share in recent years to 7 .5 per cent in 1984; 
3. animal and vegetable fats fell from 1.6 per cent of total imports 
in 1968 to 0.4 per cent a decade later, remaining fairly constant 
since; 
4. prepared foods and beverages have maintained a fairly stable share 
of total imports, falling from 5.4 per cent in 1968 to 3.1 per cent in 
1982, only to increase slightly in 1984; 
5. The common pattern therefore experienced by the four major food 
import categories, was that of a decline in total imports until the 
late 1970s, followed by a slight increase by 1984. The net result in 
all cases was however a reduction in total imports over the period 
as a whole. 
The reduction of agricultural products in total imports is reflected of 
course in import elasticities with respect to total imports of less than 
unity.26 Over the period 1968-74 all of the major food related import 
items had import elasticities significantly under one.27 For example, the 
import elasticity of live animal and animal products was 0.80, while the 
elasticity of vegetable products, animal and vegetable fats and prepared 
foods, and beverages were 0.34, 0.54 and 0.71 respectively. The analysis 
of import elasticities indicate the greatest increases in imports took place in 
wood products (1.61), glassware (1.37), jewellery (1.23), and miscellaneous 
manufacturing ( .27). 
While an examination of import elasticities is interesting in itself, a deeper 
understanding of the forces underlying the mix between Saudi Arabia im-
ported and domestically-produced food products can be obtained from 
an examination of the import elasticity of food with regard to various 
macroeconomic aggregates. Have food imports been linked to, or do they 
show slower pace than demand? How have agricultural imports preformed 
relative to other import categories? A number of macro-economic vari-
ables were selected for analysis including: non-oil income, gross domestic 
product, government expenditures, private sector expenditures, private 
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consumption, total investment, government investment and private invest-
ment. The elasticity estimates indicated: 
1. The elasticity of agricultural imports tends to be fairly high, usually 
over unity for most categories and with respect to most demand 
items other than investment. 
2. In general imports of food items tend to be most highly associated 
with non-oil income, although fairly similar results were found with 
private sector expenditures. 
3. With respect to non-oil income, agricultural imports tended to have 
slightly lower import elasticities than total imports (1.82). How-
ever, the food categories did in general have higher elasticities than 
several other major categories (textiles, and transportation equip-
ment). 
4. Contrary to the pattern found in most cross section studies,28 
the elasticity of demand for food imports tends to be greater than 
unity. 
These patterns are confirmed when examining the import elasticity with 
regard to various measures of monetary demand. Here the logarithm of 
various import categories was regressed on the logarithm of commercial 
bank credit and alternative measures of aggregate purchasing power as de-
picted by various measures of the money supply ,29 In g_~neral the results 
indicate that: · 
1. In contrast to the results found by Wilson,30 there does not appear 
to be a strong link between commercial bank credit to the private 
sector and any major category of imports. . 
2. Except for animal and vegetable fats, (a small import category in any 
case) the import elasticity for food tends to be well above unity. 
3. Imports of food tend to be highly associated with expansion of the 
money supply, with perhaps the best linkage with the M2 definition 
of money. 
4. In general the food categories tend to have the lowest elasticity of 
import of any of the major categories of imports. 
To sum up, food imports appear quite responsive to increases in overall 
demand, with Saudi Arabia having an unusually high propensity to increase 
food imports with expanded incomes and/or purchasing power. For policy 
purposes however, it would be interesting to determine whether the expan-
sion in agricultural imports was simply excess demand that could not be met 
by a growing agricultural sector, or whether these imports were largely the 
result of a buoyant demand and an unresponsive agricultural sector. To 
shed some light on this issue the logarithmic values of the various import 
categories were regressed on the log values of the major sector contributions 
to gross domestic product. Here, the results strongly indicate that: 
1. for all practical purposes there is nq relationship between agricul-
tural imports and domestic agricultural production. 
2. agricultural imports are closely related to manufacturing and whole-
sale and retail trade, both having elasticities averaging over unity. 
86 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 
3. in terms of statistical significance the link between agricultural im-
ports and manufacturing - wholesale trade is among the highest of 
the major import categories. 
From these results it is apparent that agricultural imports are largely 
demand-driven, and largely compensate for lack of responsiveness on the 
part of the domestic agricultural sector to increased levels of overall de-
mand. Clearly, a significant volume of imports would have been eliminated 
if the domestic agricultural sector had been more responsive to growing 
demand in the kingdom for food. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to explore the potential benefits of reducing 
government allocations to agriculture, an area of the Saudi budget which 
has in the past accounted for a significant share of public sector expendi-
tures. The analysis indicates that it is apparent that the government no 
longer has the resources to attempt self-sufficiency in food production, nor 
have past efforts in this regard been sufficiently encouraging to warrant con-
tinued attempts. While no formal cost benefit analysis of agricultural pro-
grammes has been undertaken here, it is apparent that the Kingdom should 
be able to offset some of the short-fall in oil revenues by diverting a substan-
tial amount of funds from its relatively inefficient agricultural programmes. 
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